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Stephen C. Calleya 
Is the Barcelona Process Working? 
EU-Policy in the Mediterranean 
Introduction 
Developments around the Mediterranean since the launching of the Euro-
Mediterranean Process (EMP) in November 1995 have underlined the 
fundamental fact that this geo-strategic area continues to be dominated by a 
mosaic of distinct sub-regional constellations, each evolving according to 
their own indigenous pattern of relations.  
• Given such a heterogeneous cluster of regional dynamics, is the EMP 
the correct mechanism to contend with the plethora of security 
challenges largely emanating along Europe’s southern periphery?  
• What can be done to make this process more effective and sustainable 
than it has been to date?  
• What are the issues at stake in this process and what relevance is this 
multilateral initiative having on the daily lives of the Euro-
Mediterranean citizens essentially seeking to address?  
1. Geo-strategic Setting  
An analysis of the society of states which are geographically proximate to 
the Mediterranean basin reveals two prominent international regions: the 
geographical space which borders the north-west sector of the 
Mediterranean which is labelled the European Union, and the geographical Stephen C. Calleya 
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area covering the south-eastern flank of the basin which is labelled the 
Middle East.  
The four sub-regions encompassing the Mediterranean are southern 
Europe, the Balkans, the Maghreb (Algeria, Tunisia, Marocco), and the 
Mashreq (Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, Egypt and the Arabic peninsula). 
Each of the sub-regions continue to follow different evolutionary patterns 
and there is very little to indicate that any of them will integrate with their 
counterparts across the Mediterranean any time soon. Relations across 
Southern Europe are largely co-operative dominant, with this group of 
countries increasing their intergovernmental and transnational ties with the 
rest of Europe on a continuous basis. In contrast, conflicting relations have 
consistently hindered closer co-operation between countries in the Balkans, 
North Africa and the Levant. Relations in these three sub-regions of the 
Mediterranean remain primarily limited at an intergovernmental level, with 
cross-border types of interaction across the southern shores of the 
Mediterranean limited to the energy sector and Islam. 
1 
The geopolitical shifts that have taken place throughout the Mediterranean 
since the Barcelona conference in November 1995, particularly the 
slowdown in Middle East peace talks and the escalation of hostilities in the 
Kosovo conflict, have forced Euro-Mediterranean strategists to reconsider 
what policy mechanisms should be introduced to ensure that the goals 
outlined in the Barcelona Declaration are attainable. This includes paying 
more attention to specific sub-regional trends that are currently manifesting 
themselves around the Mediterranean.  
The thaw in cold war relations in the Levant which systematically spread to 
other parts of the Middle East after the historic Israeli-Palestinian peace 
agreement of 1993 came to a practical halt with the election of Benjamin 
Netanyahu in late 1995. Aspirations that the Middle East peace process 
would become more comprehensive with the inclusion of both Syria and 
 
1 Calleya, Stephen (1997a): Navigating Regional Dynamics in the Post-Cold War 
World, Patterns of Relations in the Mediterranean Area, Dartmouth, pp. 131-140. 
See also Calleya, Stephen, (1997b): 'The Euro-Mediterranean Process After Malta: 
What Prospects?', Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 2, No. 2, Autumn 1997, pp. 1-22.  Is the Barcelona Process Working? 
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Lebanon were largely replaced by efforts to preserve the fragile peace 
process.  
Neither the Europeans nor the Americans were able to influence Israeli 
Prime Minister Netanyahu’s more hard-line approach to the peace process 
that resulted in a freezing of peace negotiations. The suspension of the 
MENA process in 1998 was the result of a concerted effort by the majority 
of Arab League members to terminate normal relations with Israel and 
revive the economic boycott against Israel.
2  Any hope of revitalising the 
peace process took a back seat in the last quarter of 1997 and throughout 
1998 and the first half of 1999 as Middle East leaders became more 
preoccupied with the possibility of another showdown between the United 
Nations and Iraq or Israel and its Syrian neighbours. The election of Ehud 
Barak as Israeli Prime Minister in May 1999 offers a window of 
opportunity to reactivate the dormant Middle East peace process. 
In the Maghreb, efforts to promote more co-operative relations have also 
been at more or less of a standstill in recent years. Internal strife in Algeria 
and international sanctions against Libya have stifled attempts to reactivate 
the notion of a more integrated Maghreb as was outlined in the Arab 
Maghreb Union Treaty of 1989.
3 The European Union's more active policy 
towards Algeria in 1998 and the United Nation's decision to suspend the 
sanctions regime against Libya in 1999 have helped create a more 
conducive climate to remove some of the numerous political stalemates 
that continue to prevent further intra-regional co-operation across North 
Africa.  
Along the northern shores of the Mediterranean, Southern European 
countries have also had to contend with an increase in turbulent relations in 
their vicinity. Animosity between Greece and Turkey reached quasi-hostile 
intensity in early 1996 when a dispute over the sovereignty of a number of 
 
2  International Herald Tribune, ‘Arab States Recommend Sanctions on Israel’, April 
1 1997, p. 1. 
3  Joffé, George, (1994): ‘The European Union and the Maghreb’, in Gillespie, 
Richard, (ed.), Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 1, Pinter Publishers, pp. 22-45. See also 
Camier, Alice (1991): The Countries of the Greater Arab Maghreb and the 
European Community, Commission of the European Communities, DE 68, Jan.  Stephen C. Calleya 
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Aegean Islands resulted in an escalation of military movements on both 
sides. Diplomatic initiatives to formalise a set of good neighbourly 
principles since have largely failed to move Greece and Turkey towards a 
more cordial relationship.
4 Despite diplomatic interventions by the 
European Union and the United States, Athens and Ankara also remain 
stalemated as a result of their failure to broker a peaceful resolution to the 
Cypriot issue.
5   
Since January 1997 Turkey has further strengthened its strategic alliance 
with Israel conducting a series of joint maritime search and rescue 
exercises. Operation Reliant Mermaid took place off the coast of Israel and 
included the participation of the United States and Jordan. The naval 
manoeuvres demonstrated this alliance's ability to dominate pattern of 
relations in the eastern sector of the Mediterranean. The subsequent balance 
of power shift has resulted in an occasional outcry from Iran, Syria and Iraq 
who perceive the intensification of military co-operation as a direct threat 
to their sovereignty.
6  
Further West, stability in the Balkans has blown hot and cold. Regional 
relations received a boost in December 1997 when U.S. President Clinton 
announced that U.S. troops would remain stationed in the region until a 
more secure peace was achieved. Paradoxically, instability again emerged 
when the neighbouring country of Albania  appeared to be on the brink of 
fragmentation. The increase in tension in Kosovo throughout 1998 and the 
outbreak of war between NATO and Yugoslavia in March 1999 once again 
plunged the Balkans into turmoil. The fragile peace that has emerged with 
the creation of a western Kosovo protectorate in no way guarantees that the 
decade of instability across the Balkans has come to an end.
7 
 
4 Associated Press, ‘Greece-Turkey agree to Meetings’ June 30, 1999. 
5  Coufoudakis, Van, (1996): ‘Greek Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era: 
Issues and Challenges’, Mediterranean Quarterly, 7/3, pp. 26-41. 
6 International Herald Tribune, 'Turk-Israeli Exercise: An Alliance Building Steam', 
December 20-21 1997,  pp.1, 4. 
7    Time International, ‘Who Really Won?, June 21
st 1999, pp. 20-23. Is the Barcelona Process Working? 
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2. Prospects for the Future: A Regional Assessment 
to 2010 
A number of indicators extant today can be used to project the strategic 
environment in the Mediterranean to 2010. Unless these indicators change 
significantly, the environment for the first ten years of the next century will 
be set by the year 2000. The speed with which the events in Europe and the 
Middle East are moving makes it likely that the shape this part of the world 
will take by 2010 will be clearly discernible by the end of this century. The 
United States and Europe will continue to depend on the Persian Gulf and 
North Africa for much of their energy supplies. They will however be 
joined by the likes of China and India that will need to satisfy their growing 
energy demands and therefore access to these areas will remain a high 
foreign policy priority.  
In the first half of the 1990s the Mediterranean showed signs of becoming a 
co-operative dominant area. But the past four years has witnessed an 
increase in conflicting relations throughout the Mediterranean and a 
resultant shift to an indifferent type of region. Fault-lines along a north-
south and south-south axis have become more apparent, with no sign of a 
process of regional transformation taking place.  
As relations stand, two scenarios are possible: the first is one in which a 
number of Mediterranean countries manage to integrate at both a regional 
and international level, while the rest continue to go through a process of 
fragmentation. The second is one in which the majority of countries in the 
Mediterranean are not able to integrate into the international political 
economy and gradually become failed states.  
As patterns of relations across the Euro-Mediterranean area stand, the 
majority of littoral countries in the Mediterranean seem unlikely to 
integrate into the global political economy that is emerging. Transnational 
ventures remain limited, with states in the area more concerned with intra-
state and inter-state conflicting issues than with promoting inter-state types 
of co-operation.  Stephen C. Calleya 
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If European Union efforts to foster inter-Mediterranean political and 
economic co-operation are to succeed they must be complemented by 
initiatives that Mediterranean states themselves initiate as part of a process 
that aims to create a transnational network upon which cross-border types 
of economic and financial interaction can take place. To date, the 
Mediterranean has not succeeded in creating an environment where people, 
products, ideas and services are allowed to flow freely. At the moment 
there are too many bottlenecks in the system and this will prohibit the 
region from competing and prospering in the global village of tomorrow.  
In contrast to the more cohesive and co-operative South-East Asian and 
Latin American developing regions, the Mediterranean currently consists of 
a number of sub-regional constellations, i.e., Southern Europe, the 
Maghreb, the Mashreq, and the Balkans, that are evolving along separate 
and distinct paths. Perhaps the label that best describes the pattern of 
relations in the area is "fragmegration" which denotes the integration 
efforts being pursued by the EU Southern European countries and the 
fragmentation type of relations that continues to dominate the southern and 
eastern shores of the basin. In fact, the lack of cohesion and unity achieved 
to date somewhat mirrors regional dynamics manifesting themselves across 
central Africa.
8 
During the first ten years of the new millennium the United States will shift 
its foreign policy concerns in the region further east, focusing on the 
management of relations in the Mashreq and the Persian Gulf. The rest of 
the Mediterranean will become a European Union sphere of influence once 
a common foreign and security policy is operational. In the interim, the EU 
will continue to contain instability that may emerge along its southern 
periphery. In the short-term, its priority will be to achieve internal 
cohesiveness through the successful implementation of economic and 
monetary union. In the medium term, the EU's objective will be to integrate 
as many central and eastern European countries as is feasible.  
 
8  James N. Rosenau, Rountable on "Is International Studies an Anachronism?", 
International Studies Association Annual Convention, March 20 1998, Minn., 
Minnesota. See also Rosenau, Along the Domestic-Foreign Frontier, Exploring 
Governance in a Turbulent World, Cambridge University Press, 1997.  Is the Barcelona Process Working? 
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The EU has an opportunity to further strengthen its external relations in the 
Mediterranean by strengthening its ties with the three European Union 
Mediterranean candidates of Malta, Cyprus and Turkey. Relations with the 
three countries are currently proceeding at different level and different 
speeds.  
Malta is currently gearing up for EU accession negotiations and eventual 
membership by conducting a screening process with the EU. The Maltese 
Islands hope to commence actual accession negotiations early in the year 
2000. Malta has been playing a proactive constructive role in the Euro-
Mediterranean process since its launching in Barcelona in 1995. In addition 
to hosting the second Euro-Mediterranean ministerial meeting in April 
1997, Malta is also actively promoting the idea of a stability pact for the 
Mediterranean.  
Cyprus has already commenced accession negotiations with the EU, with 
half of the thirty-one chapters already open. By the end of the Portuguese 
Presidency in mid-June 2000 Cyprus is expected to have opened all EU 
chapters for negotiation. Any EU aspirations that EU accession nego-
tiations would have a positive impact on Turkish-Greek relations and the 
division of the Mediterranean Island have however failed to materialise. 
Turkey's sheer size, religious and cultural traits, and human rights record 
continue to prevent it from becoming an EU member. The European 
Union’s indifferent attitude towards Turkey at the Luxembourg summit of 
December 1997 cast a cold shower on EU-Turkish relations that could 
become permanent unless Brussels introduces a more co-operative 
framework of relations in the near future. The stalemate between Greece 
and Turkey over Cyprus is another factor that continues to hinder EU-
Turkish relations and unless resolved in the near future could delay the next 
round of EU enlargement altogether, given Greece’s veto status. Despite 
EU pronouncements to the contrary, the EU is unlikely to adopt the Cypriot 
stalemate as it stands.  Stephen C. Calleya 
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3. The Euro-Mediterranean Summits: From Malta to 
Marseille 
The EMP is certainly the most important regional process that currently 
exists in the Mediterranean as it brings together all of the European Union 
member states and twelve Mediterranean countries which are Morocco, 
Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan, Israel, Syria, Lebanon, the Palestinian 
Authority, Turkey, Cyprus, and Malta. 
Given the more indifferent patterns of regional relations that exist in the 
Mediterranean than those that existed in November 1995, it was no small 
feat that the second EMP meeting, the first ministerial meeting of its kind 
that took place in the Mediterranean, could take place. The high turnout of 
foreign ministers at the EMP meeting in Malta, particularly the presence of 
Syria, Israel and the Palestinian Authority, illustrates the importance that 
the participating countries attach to the process that offers the possibility of 
extending co-operative patterns of relations at several levels. 
In addition to strengthening north-south relations as the EU becomes 
more active in the Mediterranean, a high priority is also being given to 
nurturing south-south relations that are to date lacking. Specific efforts are 
being made to assist Mediterranean countries become more aware of the 
opportunities that exist in their neighbouring states, and offering the 
Mediterranean countries involved in the EMP with incentive packages to 
pursue trans-Mediterranean ventures. After dedicating the majority of its 
external resources to Central and Eastern Europe at the start of the 1990s, 
the EMP is an EU attempt to revitalise its outreach programme towards the 
Mediterranean in an effort to spur co-operative relations in the area. 
At the first Euro-Mediterranean Conference which took place in Barcelona 
in November 1995 the twenty-seven partner countries established three 
principal areas of co-operation. The Barcelona Process set out three basic 
tasks: 
• a political and security partnership with the aim of establishing a 
common area of peace and stability;  Is the Barcelona Process Working? 
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• an economic and financial partnership with the aim of creating an area 
of shared prosperity;  
• a partnership in social, cultural and human affairs in an effort to 
promote understanding between cultures and exchanges between civil 
societies.
9 
The main task for the member states at the Euro-Mediterranean meeting in 
Malta in April 1997 was to elaborate more specifically on implementation 
of the partnership programme and to set up short term action plans so that 
tangible co-operative ventures could commence.  
Top of the agenda was the endorsement, or at least elaboration, of a 
security charter that will lay the foundations for the peaceful resolution of 
crisis situations and conflicts throughout the Euro-Mediterranean area. 
Such a charter would enable the partners to identify the factors of friction 
and tension in the Euro-Mediterranean area and to carry out an assessment 
of how such destabilising focal points can be managed. 
In actual fact the Malta Declaration indicates that very little headway was 
registered in moving ahead with implementing such a goal: 
The Participants take note of the work of Senior Officials on a Charter for 
peace and stability in the Euro-Mediterranean region, and instruct them to 
continue the preparatory work, taking due account of the exchanged 
documents, in order to submit an agreed text at a future Ministerial Meeting 
when political circumstances allow, (Malta Declaration, May 1997, p.4).
10  
The vagueness of the above phrase is a clear indication of the lack of 
progress that has been achieved in conceptualising a framework for setting 
up a pan-Euro-Mediterranean security arrangement. The partner countries 
found it difficult to commit them to an incremental work programme that 
would at least seek to create the necessary co-operative relations that would 
allow for the introduction of such a charter. They also failed to hammer out 
 
9   ‘Barcelona Declaration adopted at the Euro-Mediterranean Conference’ (27 and 28 
Nov. 1995). For analysis of run-up to the Barcelona conference and the Declaration 
see Esther Barbé, 1996.  
10  See appendix: ‘Malta Declaration adopted at Senior Officials meeting, Brussels, (7 
May 1997, p.5). Stephen C. Calleya 
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a specific timetable within which such a framework of analysis could be 
introduced. The stalemate in the Middle East made it all but impossible to 
even contemplate moving ahead in such a direction.  
The Euro-Mediterranean Process was given a new boost of confidence at 
an informal gathering of foreign ministers of the participating countries in 
Palermo in June 1998 during the British Presidency of the EU. The meeting 
helped to chart a less ambitious work plan in an effort to assist EMP 
countries define a practical package of confidence building measures that 
would create the necessary atmosphere within which a more elaborate 
mechanism, such as a security charter could be fleshed out.
11 
The third Euro-Mediterranean Foreign Ministerial conference that took 
place in Stuttgart in mid-April 1999 provided another opportunity to 
examine how the EMP had progressed since its launching in Barcelona in 
November 1995.
12  
The Stuttgart conference served the purpose of injecting another dosage of 
realpolitik into the Barcelona Process. Whereas the second Euro-
Mediterranean ministerial meeting in April 1997 in Malta was 
overshadowed by the stalemate that was developing in the Middle East 
peace process (MEPP), the Stuttgart conference was constantly overtaken 
by diplomatic overtures that were unfolding in the Kosovo crisis. It is now 
clear that the EMP is not a co-operative security initiative that should be 
viewed in isolation of regional dynamics unfolding simultaneously in the 
vicinity of the Euro-Mediterranean area.    
Geopolitical shifts that have occurred in the Mediterranean since the 
launching of the Barcelona process and the course of events surrounding 
subsequent high level Euro-Mediterranean ministerial meetings have made 
it blatantly clear that a strategic reassessment on how to implement the 
goals outlined in the Barcelona Declaration is necessary.  
 
11  EuroMesco Joint Report, April 1997, pp.29-36. For an analysis of prospects for 
arms limitations and confidence building measures after the Malta meeting see Fred 
Tanner, 1997, and Roberto Aliboni, 1997/98. 
12  Chairman’s Formal Conclusions, Third Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Foreign 
Ministers, Stuttgart, April 15
th-16
th 1999, see Annex. Is the Barcelona Process Working? 
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The Stuttgart conclusions again support the continuation of the Middle East 
peace process (MEPP). While this in itself is a welcome development, the 
EU has not succeeded in doing much more than pay lip service to the goal 
of revitalising the MEPP. The fact that the Euro-Mediterranean Process did 
not have a significant positive impact on the MEPP throughout Benjamin 
Netanyahu’s term as Prime Minister of Israel underlines the basic fact that 
while the success of the EMP is dependent upon advancement of the 
MEPP, the EMP has had very little influence, if any at all, on the MEPP.  
It is therefore worth seriously considering whether it makes sense for Euro-
Mediterranean policymakers to dedicate as much time and effort as they 
have been to the MEPP in future. Perhaps it would be better if the concept 
of conditionality is applied more consistently when it comes to dispersing 
political and economic resources to the Middle East region. It is also 
important to consider whether more attention should be given to enhancing 
co-operative relations in other sub-regions of the Mediterranean such as the 
Maghreb.  
It is particularly the case now that regional relations in the Middle East are 
more conducive to a resumption of peace talks with the election of Labour 
Party leader Ehud Barak and Maghrebi relations have taken a turn for the 
positive with the suspending of sanctions against Libya.  Taking into 
consideration the particular sub-regional trends that are currently 
manifesting themselves in the Mediterranean area is a prerequisite to 
spurring sub-regional and intra-regional co-operation.  
Elaboration of the political and security chapter of the EMP took a step 
forward at the Stuttgart Euro-Mediterranean foreign ministerial meeting 
with a renewed commitment to support already existing partnership 
building measures. This includes developing further the Euro-
Mediterranean information and training seminars for diplomats and 
activities of the Euro-Mediterranean Study Commission (EuroMeSCo) that 
are both contributing to the shaping of a culture of dialogue and co-
operation through informal exchange and open discussions between 
practitioners involved in the implementation of the EMP.  Stephen C. Calleya 
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The inclusion of guidelines for elaborating a Euro-Mediterranean Charter 
for Peace and Stability is also a positive development. Identifying the 
framework within which a security charter can be spelt out is essential if 
progress is to be registered. It is however clear that a Euro-Mediterranean 
Security Charter remains a long-term goal. In the interim, the guidelines are 
a good exercise in taking stock of what security concepts have been 
discussed up to now. It will also assist in identifying those areas of co-
operation where incremental steps can take place when the political 
atmosphere permits.  
At the Stuttgart meeting the EU also committed itself to continue financing 
the Euro-Mediterranean process between 2000 and 2006, although no 
precise funds were earmarked. When the EU and the European Investment 
Bank come to unveiling the MEDA II programme they should make it clear 
that the primary role of this financial mechanism is to act as a catalyst 
when it comes to promoting financial and economic co-operation. This will 
help avoid raising expectations of an economic windfall too high within the 
Mediterranean partner countries. It is also essential that bureaucratic 
bottlenecks of financing are eliminated with the introduction of simpler 
funding procedures. Otherwise interest in participating in co-operative 
Euro-Mediterranean ventures is sure to wane. 
The Stuttgart conference also provided a number of positive inputs that 
could boost the EMP partnership if properly harnessed. The invitation to 
Libya to attend the Foreign Ministerial meeting was a first step towards 
integrating this geo-strategically important North African country into the 
international community of states. The gradual integration of Libya into the 
EMP framework will facilitate the task of furthering transnational co-
operation across the southern shores of the Mediterranean in general and 
the Maghreb in particular. It could even facilitate re-launching efforts to 
activate the dormant Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) process that sought to 
emulate the European experience of integration. 
Stuttgart also identified a number of important events around which the 
EMP will evolve at the turn of the century. The decision to organize an 
investment conference and informal Foreign Ministerial conference during Is the Barcelona Process Working? 
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the first half of 2000 during the Portuguese Presidency of the EU allowed 
policy-makers to monitor developments in each chapter of the process. The 
holding of the fourth Euro-Mediterranean Foreign Ministerial meeting in 
Marseilles in November 2000 during the French Presidency of the EU also 
demonstrates the clear commitment that the EU and its partner countries 
have to further implement the objectives of Barcelona Declaration 
particularly when one considers the extremely difficult phase that Middle 
East relations have been experiencing since the collapse of peace talks at 
Camp David in July 2000. 
At the Foreign Ministerial meeting in Marseilles the ministers reconfirmed 
the necessity to reinforce the political dialogue even though the adoption of 
the Charter for Peace and Stability will have to wait until political 
circumstances allow. In the economic and financial sector the ministers 
also reconfirmed the objective of creating a free trade area by 2010 and 
called for an acceleration of ongoing association agreement negotiations 
with Algeria, Syria and Lebanon. The EU also announced a budget of 5.35 
billion euro for the new Meda programme (2000-2006) and the European 
Investment Bank has allocated 6.4 billion euro for aid loans to the 
Mediterranean for 2000-2007, with an additional 1 billion euro put in 
reserve. The total EU budget for the Mediterranean area during this period 
is therefore of 12.75 billion euro. In the social, cultural and human sector 
the ministers stressed the importance of training and employment and 
recommended the concerted preparation in the year 2001 of a regional 
programme in the field of Justice and Internal Affairs.  
 
The Ministers of Foreign Affairs also announced that they will meet again 
during the Belgian Presidency of the EU in the second half of 2001 and that 
the Fifth Euro-Med Conference would take place in the first half of 2002 
during the Spanish Presidency of the EU. Meeting at regular intervals will 
allow the partners to take stock of developments and also focus on issues 
that may be hampering implementation of the Euro-Med agenda. Stephen C. Calleya 
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4. Time to Evaluate 
When it comes to the direct tangibility it endeavours that the Euro-
Mediterranean process should seek to realise these can primarily be 
classified into three specific time-oriented categories: the short term, the 
medium term and the long term.  
In the short term, the twenty-seven partner countries must introduce a basic 
type of confidence building measure network that will enable them to 
manage and contain the large number of security challenges that risks 
upsetting stability across the Euro-Mediterranean area. The long list of 
“soft” security issues that could derail the EMP include maritime safety, 
environmental pollution, narcotics trafficking, and the flow of illegal 
migration.  
A confidence building initiative that can be introduced as part of an 
exercise that aims at the nurturing of a Euro-Mediterranean profile within 
the framework of the EMP is that of establishing a Euro-Mediterranean 
Development Centre (EMDC). The EMDC’s principal objective would be 
to promote the dissemination of information relating to the Euro-
Mediterranean process in an effort to enhance the level of transparency 
when it comes to taking decisions about the allocation of funds. Given the 
fact that DG1B is currently in the final stages of appropriating the EURO 5 
billion earmarked for MEDA I and has already commenced preparations 
for the unveiling of MEDA II for the period 2000-2006, such a measure 
should take place as soon as possible.
13 
As further progress is registered in each specific chapter of the EMP it is 
clear that there will be a need to monitor closely the large number of intra-
regional co-operative ventures that will be endorsed. Apart from its 
intrinsic value, such a co-ordinating centre will help overcome 
inconsistencies in the process and facilitate informal exchanges of views on 
a wide variety of subjects of common interest. 
 
13  Ibid., paragraph 18, p. 3.  Is the Barcelona Process Working? 
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In line with the general framework of co-operation envisaged in the 
Barcelona Declaration of 1995, the EMDC’s chief objective will be to 
encourage development in the following sectors: 
• at a macroeconomic level, with the maximum degree of convergence 
between economic, monetary and budgetary policies; 
• promoting investment by standardising trade regulations and customs 
legislation;  
• Systematic monitoring of initiatives that the EMP is seeking to 
operationalise such as industrial zones and centres of special services; 
• enhancing co-operation in sectors as diverse as science, technology, 
education, infrastructure, environment and tourism; 
• strengthening dialogue on social issues, including the narco-industry, 
migratory trends and cultural exchanges. 
The overall objective of the EMDC will be to assist in upgrading sectoral 
co-operative arrangements that currently take place in the energy, tourism 
and infrastructural sectors. Such measures are an indispensable part of the 
procedure that will have to be established if the overall goal of creating a 
free trade area is to become a reality. 
The EMDC will in the first instance become a clearing-house of EMP 
information. Its main goal will be to build a Euro-Mediterranean 
community of values by strengthening the co-operative regimes that were 
outlined in the Barcelona Declaration. 
 
In the medium term, the societal issues that the EMP will need to address if 
socio-economic conditions are to improve, includes the promotion of food 
production, trade exchanges, industrial co-operation, debt rescheduling and 
relief. An upgrade also needs to take place in investment capital, 
particularly, in the communication, transport and tourism sectors, which are 
the very growth areas of the economies of most developing countries across 
the Mediterranean. Closer co-operation between the countries concerned 
will also facilitate the promotion of alternative sources of energy such as Stephen C. Calleya 
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solar and wind energy which would make production costs cheaper and 
more sustainable.   
In the longer term, the creation of a flexible security framework that is 
already addressing soft security issues as those outlined earlier will set the 
stage for tackling more sensitive security challenges which include 
intolerant fundamentalism, demographic expansion and outright conflict.  
5. Early Warning: EMMA 
At the moment there are no elaborate mechanisms to contend with security 
crises as an accidental collision at sea between transport tankers crossing 
through the choke points such as the Straits of Sicily, or the alarming rate 
of degradation which is currently taking place in the environmental sector.  
One must also mention the proliferation of drug consignments which are 
reaching ever deeper into the civil societies of the Mediterranean, and the 
accentuation of illegal migratory flows from south to north which risks 
destablising the legal structures of the state. 
At this point in the partnership process a concerted effort should be made to 
immediately take incremental steps towards setting up an information 
mechanism that can assess the significance of such security issues and their 
likely impact on Euro-Mediterranean relations in the near future. Once this 
has been realised the co-operative maritime security network can be 
instructed to draw up policy positions on security issues that are regarded 
as the most serious.  
Ideally, at a later stage one should also investigate the feasibility of setting 
up a Euro-Mediterranean Maritime Agency (EMMA) that would be 
mandated to co-ordinate the co-operative security network with objectives 
similar to those carried out by a coastguard. The EMMA should initially 
carry out stop and search exercises in two principal areas: maritime safety 
and maritime pollution. This phase could be enhanced at a later stage by 
monitoring other aspects of security that include narcotics trafficking and 
the transport of illegal migrants.  Is the Barcelona Process Working? 
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Such an early warning mechanism should be open to any of the Euro-
Mediterranean partner states that wish to participate. In order to ensure that 
such a security model can become operational in the shortest period 
possible, the EMMA should consist of sectoral types of soft security co-
operation.  
Any two or more EMP members can start co-operating in specific sectors, 
such as that pertaining to maritime safety without having to wait until all 
partners are ready. This will enable the EMMA to evolve along sub-
regional lines before it becomes feasible to establish a fully-fledged Euro-
Mediterranean Coastguard at a later date. 
In addition to strengthening political and security channels of 
communication, the establishment of such a Euro-Mediterranean early 
warning network will assist in cultivating more intense crisis management 
mechanisms in an area where these are lacking. Areas where co-operation 
can be strengthened include conducting simulation exercises of oil spills, 
ensuring that international standards are observed during the cleaning of oil 
tankers, and monitoring the activities of non-Mediterranean fishing boats 
that are operating in the Mediterranean with a particular emphasis on over-
fishing.  
6. Conflict Prevention: Empowering EuroMarFor  
The maritime security arrangement of EuroMarFor should open its doors to 
southern Mediterranean countries (at least offer observer status in the short-
term). This will help dispel the negative perceptions that have been 
generated since the establishment of this maritime security force. At a later 
stage, this force can then become the actual confidence building enforcer of 
EMMA.   
In order to ensure that such a flexible security arrangement moves beyond 
the conceptual stage in the shortest time-frame possible, its primary 
mandate may be limited to the following codes of conduct: fact-finding and 
consultation missions, inspection and monitoring delegations. Such 
traditional rules of engagement may also be supplemented by operations Stephen C. Calleya 
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that include the facilitation of humanitarian relief particularly in times of 
natural disasters. At a later stage, situation centres may be set up around the 
Mediterranean to monitor activities under this mandate. The long list of 
security issues that would require consistent attention include: maritime 
safety, environmental pollution, narcotics trafficking, terrorism, organised 
crime, flow of illegal migration.  
In the medium to long term, the creation of a flexible security framework 
that is already addressing soft security issues as those outlined above will 
set the stage for tackling more sensitive security challenges which include 
intolerant fundamentalism, demographic expansion and outright conflict.  
7. Functions of the Euro-Mediterranean Conflict 
Prevention network 
The functions of the Euro-Mediterranean Conflict Prevention network are: 
• Monitoring political, military, and economic matters of interest to 
countries and the Euro-Med Partnership process itself; 
• Supervising and operating communications among focal points which 
have already been established as a CBM; 
• Maintaining and updating background information for crisis prevention 
and management; 
• Being prepared to provide facilities in case a contingency staff is set up 
with respect to a given crisis or conflict; 
• Supporting briefings to the public and private bodies; 
• Providing a continuous flow of information to members according to 
mandates; 
• Providing information to media. 
A decision will have to be taken on what the scope of instruments will be at 
the disposal of the network. These would range from fact-finding and 
observer missions, diplomatic and economic forms of pressure and the 
deployment of troops. The introduction of economic and diplomatic Is the Barcelona Process Working? 
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sanctions can be supplemented by the use of force if there is an escalation 
of violence.  
In a region as heterogeneous as the Mediterranean area is, the main sponsor 
of the Euro-Mediterranean conflict prevention network, the European 
Union, should only act as a mediator, leaving decision-making and action 
to the main actors directly involved in a crisis. The EU has a wide range of 
mechanisms in the economic, political and social domains that will enable 
it to influence decision-makers at the local level when it comes to 
complying with preventive measures. It is only once the majority of local 
actors, both at governmental level and the public at large, perceive that 
more will be gained by compliance, that preventive measures will be able 
to attain their true objective.      
It is only after such a threshold has been arrived at, a concerted effort 
should be made to spell out the parameters of a security charter which will 
include both confidence building and crisis prevention measures that seek 
to further advance regional disarmament. The introduction of a Euro-
Mediterranean security charter will also assist in creating a climate where 
the partner countries can develop command and control mechanisms to 
intervene as early as possible in crisis situations. Acting only after an 
aggressor has acquired territory or access to natural resources is to force the 
unwelcome choice between a massive military response and a major 
strategic debacle. The later the international community and security 
organisations intervene, the larger the cost and the less chance to restore 
stability. 
8. The Political Dimension 
The positive steps registered between the Palestinian Authority and Israel 
during the Euro-Mediterranean conference in Malta in April 1997 and 
thereafter shed light on the positive influence the European Union can have 
on the outcome of regional relations. What are the prospects for a more 
active and effective EU external policy towards the Mediterranean and the 
Middle East?  Stephen C. Calleya 
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To date, the European Union remains an economic hegemony in the 
Mediterranean area. All the countries in the basin are highly dependent on 
conducting trade with Western Europe. The aspiration of creating a Euro-
Mediterranean free trade area by the year 2010 as stipulated in the 
Barcelona Declaration of 1995 and the negotiation of “association 
agreements” with the Mediterranean partner countries in the interim augur 
well for a more assertive EU economic role in the Mediterranean.  
Whether this process will enable the EU to establish a more proactive 
political role with its southern periphery is however no foregone 
conclusion.  Such an outcome will depend largely on how successful 
Brussels is in implementing its goal of establishing a common foreign and 
security policy (CFSP) as envisaged in the Maastricht and Amsterdam 
Treaties. The appointing of such a prolific individual as Javier Solana to the 
post of High Representative of the CFSP and the creation of a policy 
planning unit for security policy are certainly welcome developments in 
this respect. Harbingers of a more active EU foreign policy towards the 
Middle East would be wise to recall that European attempts to influence 
regional dynamics in their vicinity have met with limited success in even 
the recent past: the Bosnian fiasco and the Kosovo conflict are valid cases 
in point.  
On the other hand, European Union diplomatic overtures leading up to the 
Malta, Palermo and Stuttgart foreign ministerial meetings tend to suggest 
that EU member states are gradually realising more effectively their goal of 
pooling their diplomatic resources into a single decision-making process. 
Although national interests continue to supersede the notion of a collective 
security approach to regional affairs, the Euro-Mediterranean process is at 
least providing the EU with a mechanism through which it can interact with 
the Mediterranean in a more coherent and systematic manner. 
Nevertheless, the European Union will have to advance carefully if it is not 
to upset the concept of “balancing” in relations between Mediterranean 
states and their external patrons. If the EU is perceived to be attempting to 
dominate intra-Mediterranean patterns of interaction, the latter could 
retaliate by becoming less co-operative in their dealings with specific EU Is the Barcelona Process Working? 
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member states that have substantial political and economic interests in the 
area. The consequences of such a turn of events would be very high if such 
a trans-Mediterranean backlash were to include the key oil and gas 
producers.  
The European Union must also formulate an external affairs strategy 
towards the Middle East that does not appear to be duplicating 
Washington’s endeavours to broker a peace settlement in the region. 
Failure to adopt such a policy will only result in a wastage of already 
scarce resources and could also lead to a situation where the European 
involvement in the Middle East is regarded more through a competitive 
lens than a complementary one.  
The fluid nature of contemporary international relations in the Middle East 
certainly offers the European Union with an opportunity to upgrade its 
influence in this geo-strategically proximate region. One option that could 
assist the EU in becoming more effective in the region is to introduce a 
political mechanism that will allow it to adopt a more regular, rapid and 
flexible type of involvement in the Middle East.  
This could take the form of creating a specific ad hoc committee that would 
assist the EU’s special envoy to the Middle East. This committee would be 
mandated to constantly update the EU Commission and the Council of 
Ministers about regional patterns of relations and peace process 
developments. The introduction of such a committee would also facilitate 
communication flows between Europe and the Middle East protagonists, a 
confidence building measure in itself.  
The Middle East stalemate is not only detrimental to the region itself but is 
also having a negative impact upon regional relations across the 
Mediterranean area. International initiatives such as the MENA process and 
the Euro-Mediterranean process that have attempted to spur intra-regional 
co-operation are being held hostage as a result of the lack of progress in 
peace talks. 
If a breakthrough does not emerge in the near future the international 
community under the leadership of the United States should step back from 
the current stalemate and conduct a complete re-assessment of the Middle Stephen C. Calleya 
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East situation. The European Union must also do more than simply accept 
its subordinate role in the region – it is a major economic player in the 
Middle East and should seek to play as important a political role. For some 
reason the EU has not realised that the Mediterranean area which includes 
the Middle East is its backyard and until it seeks to play an important role 
in this geo-strategic zone its aspiration of projecting a common foreign and 
security policy will remain a fallacy.  
When it comes to re-thinking how to accommodate both the Israelis and the 
Palestinians, a number of strategic models could serve as a useful guide. A 
Westphalianization blueprint would call for the immediate recognition of a 
Palestinian state. A Finlandization model would establish a neutral 
Palestinian state. A Vaticanization model would lead to the establishment 
of a religious trusteeship. A Sinaification approach would call for an 
international peacekeeping force to monitor agreed upon borders. A 
Bosnification model would seek to replicate some of the provisions 
adopted in the Dayton peace plan, while a Brusselization approach could be 
considered when it comes to discussing the future of Jerusalem, with the 
disputed city perhaps becoming the administrative capital of both Israel and 
Palestine.
14 
Given the direct bearing the Middle East peace process is already having 
on the evolution of the Euro-Mediterranean process, it certainly seems a 
logical course of action for the Europeans to consider in the run up to the 
next millennium.  
9. The Economic Dimension: Geo-economic Realities 
By about 2010 the EU will have become by far the biggest single market 
and the world's most concentrated area of economic prosperity and internal 
stability. It will comprise essentially all of Europe, east and west, more than 
90% of total European population. i.e. almost 500 million people, (half of 
 
14 Thanks to Bjorn Moller for sharing his insight during the 'World Visions' 
conference at the University of Aarhus, Denmark, December 1997.  Is the Barcelona Process Working? 
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China or India) and have a combined GDP of some 12 000 billion USD, an 
almost unimaginable figure. 
How will the 12 non-EU riparian Mediterranean countries, from Turkey to 
Morocco, adapt to these profound geopolitical changes that will take place 
north of them in the next 12 years? How will they coexist with the future 
European giant? To what extent will they be drawn into its economic and 
political orbit? To what extent will they have to integrate with the 
European and consequently the world economy? These are questions of 
vital importance for both the EU and each its Mediterranean neighbours. 
Do the Mediterranean countries still have a real alternative? Could they try 
to stay in a sort of splendid isolation within their tiny national economies, 
surrounding themselves by high walls of protection and ignoring the 
profound technological arm economic changes taking place around them? 
To date, Mediterranean trade with Europe is marginal. The majority of 
Mediterranean countries are dependent on European markets. If 
Mediterranean countries are to increase their ability to penetrate the global 
market they must diversify and improve their export capabilities.  
Economic development always starts at home. It can never be imposed 
from the outside.  It is a matter of the right mixture between individual 
freedom of action and the right government policies. This goes for each and 
every country of the globe, small or big, rich or poor. 
It is important to keep these basic considerations in mind when asking 
about the role that one very specific, and not the most important, economic 
policy, the one related to trade with the rest of the world, can play. Or, to 
put it more directly, what is the case for free trade between a Mediterranean 
country such as Egypt and the EU on the one hand, its Mediterranean 
neighbours on the other? 
The answer is straightforward: the Egyptian economy is far too small to 
satisfy its increasingly sophisticated needs for cars, food, computers; planes 
and computers on its own, i.e. to be essentially self-sufficient. Egypt 
therefore has to export goods and services in order to be able to buy from 
offers what they can supply more efficiently. But for whatever Egypt may 
wish to export to the world market it needs to be able to compete unto a Stephen C. Calleya 
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myriad of competitors hum Europe, Asia or America. The only way to 
become competitive is to expose national producers or providers of 
services to those elsewhere, as if there were no borders with artificial 
barriers like custom duties or administrative controls (licenses, quotas, 
currency restrictions etc.). 
This has been the recipe tested successfully in Europe, the USA and Japan 
during the past 50 years, since the end of the 2nd World War, which has 
allowed these countries to become the dominant economic powers at the 
end of the 20
th century. 
It was this basic philosophy, the conviction that prosperity is best enhanced 
in a climate of competition and free trade, that induced the EU and its 
Mediterranean neighbours three years ago, in Barcelona, to envisage the 
setting up of a vast Euro Mediterranean free trade area. This free trade area 
will be a zone where goods and progressively also services should be 
traded free of any restrictions, as if within national borders. Deregulation 
and liberalization are therefore very much the name of the game.  
This objective has been laid down in a comprehensive policy document, the 
Barcelona Declaration, in November 1995. The 27 foreign ministers of the 
signatory states, that is, all fifteen European Union member states and 
twelve Mediterranean countries, agreed to work towards establishing a 
Euro-Mediterranean free trade within 15 years, by about 2010. 
10. The State of Play 
Where do we stand presently with the implementation of that ambitious 
long-term objective? What remains to be done? What are the obstacles on 
the way? And what are the chances of the target date of 2010 being 
respected? 
From the EU side, the situation looks as follows: 
• with five Mediterranean countries (Israel, Turkey, Malta, Cyprus, 
Palestine), covering almost 50% of all EU trade with the Mediterranean 
free trade has been essentially completed (totally for manufactured 
products, partially for agricultural products) Is the Barcelona Process Working? 
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• with three countries (Tunisia, Morocco and Jordan) free trade has been 
agreed; it will be progressively established during a 12 year transition 
period and should essentially be completed by the target date of 2010; 
• with four countries (Egypt, Lebanon, Algeria and Syria) negotiations are 
still under way. Assuming optimistically that these will be concluded by 
the end of 2000, followed by two years of ratification, free trade might 
be completed by 2015 only. 
Free trade between Mediterranean countries and the EU will open the way 
for free trade among the Mediterranean countries themselves. Indeed, it is 
difficult to contemplate that at some stage Egypt will freely import 
furniture or metals from Greece, while subjecting those same products from 
Jordan or Tunisia to high import duties or other import restrictions. 
Intra-Mediterranean free trade therefore follows as a logical corollary from 
Euro-Mediterranean free trade. 
Presently Mediterranean countries do less than 10% of their total trade 
among themselves. This is clearly insufficient for neighbouring countries. 
The trade potential is insufficiently exploited because of high, sometimes 
even prohibitive trade barriers, every country attempting to protect its tiny 
manufacturing sector as well as its agriculture.  
Enhancing horizontal trade patterns across the Mediterranean is therefore 
one of the central goals of the Barcelona Process. The EMP has so far 
failed to seriously financially support intra-regional economic co-operation 
in the region. Only ten per cent of the overall MEDA I funding budget 
(1995-1999) was allocated to regional initiatives. The remaining ninety per 
cent has been earmarked for bilateral co-operative agreements between the 
EU and its southern partners. If anything, this is likely to lead to an 
increase in vertical trade.  
A more logical alternative would be to dedicate a larger proportion of the 
forthcoming budget, MEDA II (2000-2006), to regional projects. Such 
projects should aim at assisting Mediterranean partner countries establish 
industrial sectors in areas where they already have a comparative 
advantage. This will avoid wasting the already limited funding which is Stephen C. Calleya 
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available and simultaneously ensure that a more diversified Mediterranean 
economic base is created.   
The logic of Mediterranean or even all-Arab free trade has been clearly 
recognised by policy makers for more than 50 years, since the very start of 
the Arab League in 1948. But action has failed to follow until very 
recently. The Euro-Mediterranean initiative has given a new impetus to 
Mediterranean free trade. 
In 1997, spectacular progress towards Mediterranean free trade has been 
achieved, when Turkey and lsrael, the two economic 'giants' in the 
Mediterranean agreed to go for bilateral free trade. The Arab countries 
around the Mediterranean have not yet clearly decided on how to proceed. 
They have, for good reasons, concentrated on the EU front, assuming that 
they would more easily achieve a breakthrough among themselves once 
they will be tied by free trade to their giant neighbour in the north whose 
competition they have to fear much more than that of immediate 
neighbours. 
Thus they have kept hesitating between a bilateral approach, with Egypt, 
Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia agreeing on reciprocal tariff concessions for 
specific products, and an all-Arab approach. 
Indeed, in 1997, in reaction both to the Euro Mediterranean and the 
Turkish-lsrael Initiative, the Arab League has decided (once again) to 
launch an all Arab free trade agreement (AFTA). 18 of the 22 Members of 
the Arab League have signed the agreement that provides for the reciprocal 
elimination of all duties by 2008. But only 12 of the 18 signatories have 
effectively proceeded with the cutting of duties by 10% by 1
st January 
1998, as provided; moreover more than half of the products were put in 
exemption. Thus, however good the intentions to finally organise all-Arab 
free trade, the results look anything but promising. 
Free trade must be transparent and comprehensive, if it is to have the 
desired impact on the patterns of trade and production. If it is to be realised 
during a transition period, of 5 to 10 years, the calendar must be clear and 
absolutely trustworthy. The agreed tariff cuts must be implemented 100%, Is the Barcelona Process Working? 
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and they must not be replaced by other even more restrictive trade 
obstacles. Monitoring and policing of the agreements has to be seen as 
absolutely indispensable for the credibility of the whole enterprise. For 
economic operators must firmly believe in the process, they must anticipate 
its results and help to bring it about. All this has so far not been the case for 
the Arab countries' efforts to establish free trade among themselves. 
One should therefore carefully monitor what is going to happen when it 
comes to forthcoming tariff cuts as envisaged under the AFTA agreement. 
If implementation is as poor as on 1st January 1998, when only two-thirds 
of the signatories acted at all, but only on half of the product coverage, the 
all-Arab initiative be better replaced by a more limited but serious and 
well-prepared approach by those Arab Mediterranean countries that have 
signed free trade agreements with the EU. This should be complemented by 
similar agreements with the Gulf Co-operation Council States (GCC) that 
have already successfully implemented free trade among their six members 
states. These 10 core countries should form the basis of what may 
progressively become a vast European-Mediterranean free trade area, with 
Turkey and possibly Israel to be included when the time will be ripe. 
Stability across the Mediterranean is crucial if the necessary investment 
capital required to ameliorate economic conditions in the area is to be 
successfully attracted. The difficulty in attracting private investment to the 
Mediterranean area in the current uncertain climate is clear. This helps to 
partly explain why the Mediterranean has so far only succeeded in 
attracting less than two per cent of international investment.   
In this respect it should be noted that growing disparities between per 
capita incomes on the Northern and Southern shores of the Mediterranean 
have continued to increase, even in states such as Morocco and Tunisia, 
where stringent economic reforms and structural adjustment programmes 
have been introduced. The significant extent of economic disparities in the 
Mediterranean along a north-south axis is evident when one compares the 
1994 annual average World Bank figures of $18,000 per capita income to 
the North, and only $700 per capita to the South.  Stephen C. Calleya 
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The 4.6 billion ECUs agreed at the Cannes Summit in July 1995 to fund the 
Euro-Mediterranean initiative over a five year period still only represents 
about half of the 7.4 billion ECUs earmarked for East and Central Europe 
over the same period, where the population totals 96 million people, as 
opposed to 230 million people in the Mediterranean basin. Moreover, the 
funds of the EU have dedicated to the Mediterranean for the 1995-1999 
period is less than one third of the trade surplus it achieved with the 12 
Mediterranean partners and Libya in 1995 (13.7 billion ECU) and less than 
half the trade surplus it registered with the same area during 1993 (12.1 
billion ECU) and a little more than half the surplus obtained during 1994 
(9.3 billion ECU), (see Appendix Two, EUROSTAT, 1997).
15 
If the Euro-Mediterranean Process (EMP) is therefore to be regarded as a 
credible initiative it will have to identify and operationalise a series of co-
operative cross-border projects that will act as a catalyst to increase the 
interest of international investors to this part of the world. Otherwise, the 
objective of establishing a more economically balanced Euro-
Mediterranean area will not transpire. Although free trade in itself is likely 
to increase the level of trade between the northern and southern countries 
of the Mediterranean, there is nothing to guarantee that this will necessarily 
reduce the wide level of economic disparities that currently exist. In fact, 
an increase in EU exports to the Mediterranean would only exacerbate the 
negative balance of payments which countries in the south are 
experiencing.  
The harsh economic realities that Mexico has had to confront since signing 
up to the NAFTA agreement is indicative of the negative impact the 
introduction of free trade measures can have upon developing countries. In 
effect, the creation of a free trade area could end up reinforcing current 
North-South and South-South divides as riparian states of the 
Mediterranean find it more and more difficult to attract international 
investment.  
The creation of a free trade area is nevertheless certain to boost trade. But 
there should be no reason for euphoria. Even supposing the Mediterranean 
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countries will be successful in streamlining and restructuring their 
manufacturing industries and in developing competitive export 
opportunities, this will not transform all of them into Mediterranean 
‘tigers’. Turkey’s example shows, however, that the intensity of trade 
between Europe and individual Arab countries can grow enormously, 
especially for countries like Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia, provided more 
entrepreneurs discover the art of developing export markets.  
Subcontracting should, of course, increase substantially, especially between 
Egypt and Europe (where it is practically non-existent), and thanks to the 
cumulation of origin from different sources around the Mediterranean (and 
even in the Gulf). Agricultural trade, though it will become much less 
hampered by tariffs and other restrictions, will grow much less, probably 
more to the advantage of Europe than the other way round, because of 
increasing difficulties on the Arab side to generate exportable surpluses.    
Free trade should by 2015 also extend to the GCC countries and Europe. 
The completion of the Association Agreement between Egypt and the EU 
will give a boost in that direction. The inclusion of the Gulf countries (Iraq) 
into this network will substantially strengthen European Arab relations, 
both in a vertical and a horizontal sense.  
The question must also be asked what impact will the outflow of capital 
have on the Mediterranean area as economic and financial policies become 
more liberal? Will the free flow of capital result in a situation where the 
rich become richer and the poor become poorer?  
It is thus essential that the Mediterranean countries must work towards 
creating an economic and financial institutional design that will generate 
wealth. At the end of the twentieth century the label “emerging markets” is 
actually regarded by some as being synonymous with weak economies. The 
international economic crisis that began in the Asia-Pacific and later spread 
to Russia and more recently Latin America has cast a darker shadow on 
developing countries.   
If international economic organisations, such as the European Investment 
Bank (EIB), are serious about assisting the Mediterranean countries they 
should adopt more proactive strategies towards this area. This should Stephen C. Calleya 
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include offering developing states credit guarantees and introducing 
measures to address the serious debt burden several countries in the region 
are coping with.  
In the short to medium term it also appears essential that some type of a 
compensation fund be created for those sectors of the population in the 
least developed countries of the Mediterranean that will suffer most of the 
socio-economic brunt that free trade could bring with it. Such political 
action will also give credence to the EU claim that its main interest is to 
ameliorate socio-economic living conditions throughout the Mediterranean 
area. 
During the past three years the EU has reiterated that one of the central 
goals of the EMP is the creation of a free trade area by the year 2010. This 
is to be systematically realised by implementing the second chapter of the 
Barcelona Declaration that is dedicated towards the establishment of an 
economic and financial partnership between the twenty-seven countries 
with the ultimate aim of creating an area of shared prosperity.
16 
Now that a period of time has lapsed since the launching of the Barcelona 
process the following questions should be addressed: 
• How realistic and feasible are such goals given the enormous socio-
economic disparities which exist across the Euro-Mediterranean area?  
• What can one expect to emerge in the run up to the new millennium in 
respect to this dimension of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership 
process? 
• Should a more flexible integration model and timeframe be considered 
given the heterogeneous nature of the Partner countries? 
• What should a post-free trade area strategy consist of?  
A prerequisite to spurring the existing low levels of intra-regional 
economic relations in the Mediterranean to a free trade or common market 
 
16  Marks, Jon, (1996): ‘High Hopes and Low Motives: The New Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership Initiative’, Mediterranean Politics, 1/1, pp. 17-19. See also Calleya, 
Stephan, op.cit., pp. 205-210. 
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level of integration is the maintenance of co-operative relations between 
the countries in the Euro-Mediterranean process, particularly those located 
along the southern and eastern shores of the basin.  
The volatile nature of relations between Israel and the Palestinian 
Authority, Syria and Lebanon’s indifference to the peace process in 
general, the escalation of tension between Greece and Turkey, the failure to 
negotiate a settlement to the Cypriot stalemate, and European concerns on 
the increase of violence in Algeria, are just some of the examples which 
one can mention to illustrate the fragility of peaceful relations in the area. 
Light has been further shed on the plethora of obstacles that one has to 
overcome before the concept of partnership building can take root in the 
economic sector by the Middle East-North Africa (MENA) economic 
process. Only after four summits in Casablanca, Amman, Cairo and Doha 
in 1994, 1995, 1996, and 1997 respectively, was significant headway 
registered in the direction of setting up a Middle East development bank.
17 
It therefore comes as little surprise that the concept of establishing a Euro-
Mediterranean development bank is something for the distant future.        
The majority of Mediterranean countries are aware that an economic 
restructuring phase is a necessary but a bitter pill they would rather refrain 
from swallowing. International economic institutions have to date failed to 
communicate the message that unless such a transition exercise takes place 
in the near future, the Mediterranean will run the risk of being relegated to 
the doldrums of the globalisation process that is currently underway. 
The shocks that both the MENA and the EMP processes, have experienced 
in the last twelve months reflect the basic fact that the Mediterranean 
countries have not succeeded in adapting rapidly enough to the 
globalisation process.  
There is therefore an urgent need for more of a self-help attitude to be 
adopted by the Mediterranean countries themselves. Littoral countries need 
to identify productive niche areas and start to dedicate research and 
development budgets to developing such areas of production. Specialising Stephen C. Calleya 
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in areas that complement one another will enable Mediterranean countries 
to adopt a co-operative trade strategy with their counterparts in the region 
and avoid duplicating development efforts. This will in turn facilitate the 
task of spurring intra-regional trade since an increase in economic diversity 
will enable Mediterranean countries to enhance the level of trade with one 
another.  
As mentioned earlier, investment funds to the Mediterranean currently 
stand at less than 2 per cent of total international financial flows. Although 
the Mediterranean area has not been directly effected by the regional 
economic crisis during the last two years, this is not due to the region’s 
economic policies. It is rather the result of the fact that the Mediterranean 
has not yet successfully integrated into the international political economy. 
Mediterranean countries must also be aware that the economic crisis that 
seriously struck Asian tiger countries will make those countries that are 
able to introduce the necessary reforms even more competitive now that the 
price of their exports has dropped.  
Unless the Mediterranean is able to improve its economic diplomacy track 
record by introducing the necessary measures to attract the attention of 
international investors, the latter are much more likely to be attracted to 
other developing regions. Both Central and Eastern Europe (CEFTA), and 
the southern cone of Latin America (Mercosur), have already demonstrated 
an ability to integrate with one another and are therefore better positioned 
to reap the benefits of globalisation.  
A more realistic and crucial short-term goal is that of spurring horizontal 
types of economic co-operation to complement the to date dominant 
vertical forms of economic interaction that characterise Euro-
Mediterranean economic and financial relations. As part of its effort to 
foster more intense south-south economic forms of co-operation the Euro-
Mediterranean process has dedicated a substantial proportion of its 
resources since November 1995 to encouraging cross-border types of 
commercial ventures. The result has been the spontaneous emergence of 
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Euro-Mediterranean chambers of commerce, industrial federations, trade 
fairs, and export promotion agencies.  
As stated earlier, at a bilateral level, the European Union has already signed 
Association Agreements with Morocco, Tunisia, Israel, the Palestinian 
Authority, and Jordan and is currently negotiating similar agreements with 
all its Mediterranean Partners. The EU regards this as a natural progression 
towards creating a Free Trade Area in about twelve years. The EU is 
however concerned that a stalemate in the Middle East peace process may 
slow down further progress in this area. Negotiations with Lebanon remain 
blocked. Those with Egypt have run into agricultural problems, and 
although the Commission has a brief to negotiate with Syria it is not clear 
how the negotiations will develop. Implementation of the agreement with 
the Palestinian Authority has been delayed due to Israel.
18 
In recent years the EU Commission has stressed that a concerted effort 
needs to take place to assist the Mediterranean Partners in their effort to 
replicate aspects of the European single market within their own countries. 
This would include adopting similar competition law, systems for norms 
and standardisation and the harmonisation of customs procedures. Only 
such a strategy would enable them to become more competitive on an 
international level, and ensure that Mediterranean countries would gain 
more access to European and international markets.
19 
An increase in private flows of capital to the Mediterranean will only result 
if the countries concerned move away from dependency upon the energy 
sector and the low margin ends of the textile and tourism markets towards 
high value-added industries such as specialised tourism and garment and 
component production. There is also a necessity to diversify in investment 
instruments, so that larger flows of portfolio investments bolster the 
performance of Mediterranean stock markets.
20 
 
18  Agence Europe, 'EU/Mediterranean', 6 February 1998, p.2. 
19  Discussion with Vice-President of the European Commission, Manuel Marin, 2 
April 1997, Malta. 
20 Marin, Manuel, (1997): ‘Partners in Progress’, Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, 
vol. 2, London, pp. 7-8. Stephen C. Calleya 
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11. Prospects for the Future 
The progressive establishment of Euro-Mediterranean free trade in the 
coming 15 years will have far-reaching consequences for Mediterranean 
societies and economies: 
• It will vastly enhance the volume of trade within that gigantic trade area. 
One may expect that by 2015 the participating 40 odd countries will do 
50-60% of all their trade within the zone; 
• It will have a positive impact on the amount of foreign direct investment 
in the Mediterranean countries: with assured market access and an 
improved overall political and economic environment, European, 
American and Asian investors will find it much more attractive to 
invest; 
• It will accelerate the pace of social and political reforms, the business 
community will want to have a say in political matters, whether these 
concern the tax regime, the level of education, the functioning of the 
judiciary, social security etc. 
But this being said, free trade is no panacea to inadequacies of economic 
policies or of social injustice. Nor will it introduce Western democracy 
quasi overnight. Free trade may act as a powerful agent of social and 
economic change, as we have seen in Europe for the last 40 years, but only 
if many other conditions even more difficult to achieve will be fulfilled. 
This can only done by each country on its own, according to its specific 
requirements and possibilities. Europe can serve as an example, even as a 
precedent. But it cannot do the reform work for others. The hard work of 
learning must always be done by those directly concerned, be they 
individuals or societies. 
The EU now stands alongside the World Bank and the IMF as the Euro-
Mediterranean region’s main partners in economic dialogue. But it 
ultimately remains the Mediterranean countries’ task to become more 
competitive if they are to integrate further into the rapidly evolving global 
political economy. The EMP must therefore concentrate on finding the Is the Barcelona Process Working? 
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most effective way to act as a catalyst towards realising the goal of re-
establishing a common Euro-Mediterranean area of prosperity.  
As the great French historian Fernand Braudel reminds us the 
Mediterranean was an economic unity long before Europe. During the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries while very little transcontinental trade 
took place across Europe, the Mediterranean Sea served as an open area for 
commercial and cultural trade. The Euro-Mediterranean process offers both 
Europe and the Mediterranean an opportunity to lay the foundations upon 
which a free trade area can established early in the twenty-first century.  
12. The Cultural Dimension 
The Mediterranean epitomizes many of the problems associated with the 
North-South debate. These include migration, terrorism, religious 
intolerance and the lack of human rights. Nurturing co-operative cross-
cultural patterns of interaction which address these issues is a prerequisite 
to improving economic disparities and ethnic divisions in the area. 
The eastern Mediterranean is the historic cross-roads for diverse ethnic, 
cultural, and religious traditions. How can these be safeguarded and 
respected while at the same time tolerance and understanding are 
promoted? Can the Barcelona Process' proposals for educational exchanges 
be turned into concrete and practical programmes?   
A concerted effort is required to remove misperceptions and prejudice 
which continue to exist across the Mediterranean. This is where 
international cultural activities, such as cultural tourism, may play a 
strategic role as culture brings about relations based on trust. Tangible 
proposals that actually initiate cross-cultural ventures of co-operation and 
seek to further the principles of respect and understanding that are still 
lacking are long overdue.  
Common socio-economic concerns might be one point of embarkation in 
this respect. It should be mentioned that Euro-Mediterranean networks of 
economic co-operation have already been created in a number of areas and 
include Chambers of Commerce, Federations of Industry, commercial fairs, Stephen C. Calleya 
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export promotion bodies, and banking associations. These networks aim at 
establishing permanent links that will enable the exchange of information 
and projects that will facilitate agreement on respective policies and better 
implementation.   
The third chapter of the EMP termed "Partnership in Social and Human 
Affairs: Promoting Exchanges between Civil Societies" promotes the idea 
that the countries concerned should work to encourage the participation of 
civil society in the EMP. This is to involve joint efforts in education and 
training, social development, policies designed to reduce migratory 
pressures, the fight against drug trafficking, terrorism and international 
crime, judicial co-operation, the fight against racism and xenophobia, and a 
campaign against corruption. 
Further ideas that have been proposed include joint efforts with regard to 
culture and media, health policy, the promotion of exchanges and 
development of contact among young people in the framework of a 
decentralised co-operation programme. Throughout there has been an 
emphasis on the importance of dialogue between cultures, and exchanges at 
human, scientific and technological level, deemed as an essential factor in 
bringing people closer, promoting understanding between them and 
improving their perception of one another. 
But, whereas the political and security and the economic and financial 
chapters of the EMP have been handled in a "fast-track" manner by 
different parties participating in the Barcelona Process, the social and 
cultural chapter has been the subject of long debates and discussions. This 
is largely due to the fact that the Arab and European views differ sharply 
on issues such as human rights, immigration, terrorism, the right of 
political asylum and the role of civil society.  
The Barcelona Declaration acknowledges the essential role civil society 
must play in the EMP. The Euro-Med Civil Forum, which took place in 
November 1995, was the first formal consolidation of civil society as a 
partner within the process. It gathered 1200 experts from very diverse 
fields, representing civil society in countries from the northern, eastern and 
southern shores of the Mediterranean. The second Euro-Med Civil Forum Is the Barcelona Process Working? 
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took place in Naples in December 1997. Even if one points to the various 
cultural aspects that have been tackled in these meetings and the numerous 
projects that were approved in the field of cultural heritage, progress has 
been slow and difficult. Few tangible results have emanated from the 
ministerial meetings that have taken place.
21       
The Third Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial in Stuttgart nevertheless 
reaffirmed the importance of the Civil Forum underlining that regional and 
local authorities should be more closely associated, as should the business 
community and the non-governmental organisations. Several Civil forums 
were also held in parallel with the Stuttgart conference and these gatherings 
made recommendations for future activities concerning human rights, the 
environment and the setting up of a Euro-Med Forum of Trade Unions. It 
remains to be seen whether the positive remarks regarding the Civil  
forums that are included in the Stuttgart Conclusions will eventually assist 
in strengthening the dialogue between governments and civil society.
22  
Three and a half years into the Euro-Mediterranean Process it is clear that 
civil forums must play a more direct role in the implementation phase of 
the Process if this multilateral initiative is to be strengthened and 
sustainable. It is only through the direct participation of non-governmental 
organisations that a more grass roots type of Euro-Mediterranean 
community will be nurtured.  
But before significant steps can be taken in this direction the EU must itself 
decide what policy positions it is prepared to adopt in this sector of the 
Partnership. For example, should the EU turn a blind eye to regimes whose 
respect for human rights and democratic principles are widely criticised 
throughout the Mediterranean? If not, how can Europe's concerns be turned 
into actions that receive widespread popular support in the region? What 
can be done to further strengthen the role of civil society? 
Suggestions that should be considered: 
 
21  Roque, Maria Angels, (1997), 'Position Paper on the Role of Civil Society', 
Intercultural Dialogue in the Mediterranean, Foundation for International Studies, 
pp. 18-23. Stephen C. Calleya 
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• Promote dialogue between the civilisations in the Mediterranean; 
• Aim at a more objective portrayal of cultural characteristics found in the 
Mediterranean, in the European and international media; 
• Encourage the development of civil society and non-governmental 
organisations. This would assist in nurturing a sense of national unity 
and stem the threat of rising ethnic, religious and social conflicts; 
• Establish a Euro-Mediterranean Institute for Democracy and entrust it 
with the implementation of a democracy building programme similar to 
what has been undertaken in the countries of Eastern Europe and the 
former Soviet Union.
23   
Steps taken in this direction will immediately have a positive impact upon 
the contribution civil forums are making to regional stability across the 
Euro-Mediterranean area. A more integrated civil forum will also ensure 
that co-ordination in this field of co-operation is further enhanced. 
13. Lessons to be drawn from the Euro-Mediterranean 
Process  
Throughout its twenty-six years of direct engagement in the Mediterranean 
the European Union has failed to contain, let alone reverse, economic 
disparities between  the northern and southern countries of the basin. It is 
also quite clear that little progress has been registered in removing the 
misperceptions and prejudice that currently exist in the region or in 
promoting further the principles of respect and understanding. A concerted 
effort in implementing the goals set out in the third chapter of the 
Barcelona Declaration is certainly the most effective way to start tackling 
such problems. 
 
22  Chairman’s Formal Conclusions, Third Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Foreign 
Ministers, Stuttgart, April 15th-16th 1999, paragraph 30.  
23  Makram-Ebeid, Mona, (1997), 'Prospects For Euro-Mediterranean Relations',  
Intercultural Dialogue in the Mediterranean, Foundation for International Studies, 
pp. 38-53.  Is the Barcelona Process Working? 
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It is fundamentally clear that the EMP offers a unique opportunity to 
strengthen political, economic and cultural ties across the Euro-
Mediterranean area. But such progress will only be registered if the twenty-
seven partner countries direct their actions at the causes rather than the 
symptoms of contemporary security risks. This is not to say that 
humanitarian and development assistance is not essential, but this should 
not become a substitute for efforts that are geared towards increasing 
higher levels of co-operation between the countries of the Mediterranean. 
A cost/benefit analysis of the EMP to date reveals a large number of 
lessons that can be taken note of about the partnership exercise itself. 
Euro-Mediterranean ministerial meetings have shed light on the fact that 
the objectives spelt out in the Barcelona Declaration will not become 
attainable without a focused in-depth series of work plans that are more 
short-term oriented in nature. In technical terms, one should not expect 
vertical integration to proceed at a rapid speed without a complementary 
effort occurring at the horizontal level. 
Given the state of international relations in the Mediterranean, the Euro-
Mediterranean process is probably the most adequate type of multilateral 
forum that can further co-operative security in the area. The process is to be 
credited for committing the Europeans to co-operate with their 
Mediterranean neighbours in a much more comprehensive sense than 
previously the case.  
One should not overlook the fact that the EMP is the only regional 
institutional arrangement that brings together such a large number of 
Mediterranean countries. To date, no other trans-Mediterranean security 
arrangement has been able to move beyond the theoretical stage of 
development.
24  
Malta must be credited for providing the environment where such co-
operative types of interaction could take place. The ability to offer the 
diplomatic means that are essential to the peaceful settlement of disputes 
 
24  Calleya, Stephen, op.cit., (1997a), pp. 141-164. See also Wriggins, W.H. et al 
(1992): The Dynamics of Regional Politics: Four Systems on the Indian Ocean 
Rim, Columbia University Press, New York, pp. 293-294. Stephen C. Calleya 
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and include that of providing good offices is certainly to be welcomed. 
Facilitating dialogue between parties to an international dispute and 
seeking to bring about an amicable solution of existing disputes is the only 
way the Mediterranean will avoid becoming a conflict based region.  
The Malta and Palermo Euro-Mediterranean meetings must also be credited 
for injecting a dosage of realism into the process. The partnership 
framework launched in Barcelona must consistently be adapted to the 
constantly evolving geo-strategic area it is seeking to function within if it is 
to remain functional and sustainable. It is a valuable lesson to take note of, 
particularly at such an early stage of the process. 
The Third Euro-Mediterranean foreign ministerial meeting in Stuttgart in 
April 1999 also highlighted a number of other lessons that should be taken 
note of if the EMP is to become a more effective process. First, the EMP 
continues to lack visibility. It has not had enough of a direct positive 
impact on the Euro-Mediterranean citizens it is supposed to be addressing. 
This can be overcome by directing more of future Euro-Mediterranean 
programmes to the civil societal level.  
Second, the Euro-Mediterranean partnership runs the serious risk of being 
downgraded on the European Union international agenda. The launching of 
the EURO, the enlargement process towards Central and Eastern Europe 
and the increase in interest to develop a post-Kosovo EU/Balkan strategic 
relationship, could gradually lead to a marginalisation of the 
Mediterranean. The Mediterranean Partner countries would therefore do 
well to adopt a more progressive and constructive attitude towards Brussels 
in order to avoid such an attitude of indifference settling in.  
Third, more attention needs to be given to the third pillar of the EMP, that 
dealing with social, cultural, and human affairs. This volet has to date been 
rather neglected. Closer cross-cultural co-operation can only be achieved if 
a more concerted effort is made to seek a convergence on the basic values 
that are part and parcel of the civilisations surrounding the Mediterranean 
area. 
At the same time, an analysis of the ability of international organisations to 
influence regional relations reveals that while they are often capable of Is the Barcelona Process Working? 
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having an impact on the regional patterns of relations they are unable to 
alter the basic pattern of regional alignment and conflict within such 
international regions. Contemporary EU involvement in the Mediterranean 
is a good example of an international organisations’ limited ability to 
influence regional dynamics. In reality, the EU’s Mediterranean policy is 
best seen as a boundary management exercise, rather than a boundary 
transformation one. Its principal aim is to safeguard the process of regional 
integration in Western Europe from that of fragmentation that is active 
throughout the Middle East.
25  
The success or failure of the EMP will actually determine whether the 
Mediterranean becomes a crossroad of tension, outright conflict and an 
economic wasteland, or whether it becomes a co-operative zone of peace, 
prosperity and tolerance. Three and a half years since its launching, the 
process still holds a great deal of potential, but only if it is adapted to the 
ever changing regional security dynamics it is attempting to stabilise. 
On the eve of the twenty-first century, the Mediterranean is more akin to a 
fault-line between the prosperous North (the haves), and an impoverished 
South, (the have-nots). The key development to watch in the Mediterranean 
in the next decade will be to see whether the phase of co-operative 
competition that has dominated post-Cold War relations to date is 
eventually superseded by an era of conflicting competition. If this age of 
indifference scenario does take hold, disorder will dominate Mediterranean 
relations and as resources are depleted, the region will become an 
economic wasteland.  
In the post-Cold War world that has emerged, the patterns of relations in 
the Mediterranean have already moved away from a co-operative security 
dominant framework to a more competitive security based model. If trends 
continue as they have been, the Mediterranean is destined to become a geo-
strategic zone of indifference. Soft security risks will multiply, 
demographic growth will exacerbate economic problems, and the 
 
25 Calleya, Stephen, op.cit., (1997a), p. 186. 
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developed world will adopt a selective engagement approach towards the 
area. (See Appendix One).     
The only way this scenario can be avoided is if the Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership process is overhauled, international institutions such as the 
World Bank and the IMF become more aggressive in their dealings with 
the region, and the Mediterranean countries themselves adopt a self-help 
mentality.  
Rather than undermine or diminish the significance of the EMP, the quasi-
conflictual pattern of relations in several pockets of the Mediterranean 
underlines further the significance of the Euro-Mediterranean process, the 
only multilateral process of its kind in the area.  
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Appendix 1: 
Mediterranean Geo-Political Scenarios  
in the Year 2010 
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Appendix 2:  
EU TRADE SURPLUS WITH MEDITERRANEAN  
HITS 13.7 BN ECU 
 
Exports up sharply by 10% 
 
The EU’s trade surplus with the 13 Mediterranean countries (Malta, 
Cyprus, Turkey, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Jordan, Syria, 
Lebanon, Israel and Gaza-Jericho) rose to a “remarkable” 13.7 bn ECU in 
1995, according to a report today from Eurostat, the Statistical Office of the 
European Communities in Luxembourg (EUROSTAT Statistics in Focus, 
External trade no 13/96, EU trade with the Mediterranean countries, results 
for 1995). In 1994 the surplus was 10.4 bn. 
The report says trade relations with the Mediterranean are of major 
importance to the EU, although their share of total EU external trade has 
shrunk somewhat in recent years. In 1995 their share of all EU exports and 
imports amounted to 9.3% and 7.2% respectively. 
In 1995, EU imports from the Mediterranean countries rose by 4% over 
1994. Exports were up sharply by 10% after a slight fall of 0.5% the 
previous year. 
Turkey most important supplier 
Petroleum products, clothing, textile yarns and fabrics, and fruits and 
vegetables were the most important imports in 1995. Together they made 
up 60% of all EU imports from these countries. 
EU exports to the area were concentrated mainly in machinery and 
transports equipment - 38% of the total - and miscellaneous manufactured 
goods (32%). Is the Barcelona Process Working? 
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Germany, France and Italy accounted for more than 60% of both exports to 
and imports from the Mediterranean basin. On the other side Turkey (26%), 
Israel (16%) and Algeria (12%) accounted for more than half of the EU’s 
total trade flows with the region. 
Turkey also stands out as the most important EU supplier: in 1995 it was 
the source of some 24% (9.2 bn ECU) of all the Union’s imports from the 
region. It was followed by Algeria and Libya (both 15% or around 6 bn 
ECU). 
Malta, Lebanon and Israel recorded the highest levels of intra-industry 
trade with the EU (that means that bilateral trade flows - exports and 
imports - are concentrated in the same industries). 
Trade with Syria, Libya and Algeria was restricted largely to inter-sectoral 
exchanges. 
Positive balances for all except Portugal 
France and Germany recorded the largest surpluses: 3.7 bn and 2.7 bn ECU 
respectively. All Member States had positive balances - except Portugal 
with a small deficit of around 0.2 bn. 
Finland and Sweden showed the most dynamic export growth in 1995: 27% 
and 24% respectively. Ireland recorded the highest percentage change in 
imports - a rise of 31%. 
 
Source: EUROSTAT No. 7/97 28 January 1999 
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